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FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FEDERAL COURTS––
WITNESSES, EVIDENCE, AND CONDUCT OF COUNSEL: 
ASSESSING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE TO 
PROVE WITNESS BIAS 
Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Ventura v. Kyle, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals formed two 
major holdings that differed with the holdings from the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.  This case involved former 
Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura, Navy SEAL and author Chris Kyle, 
and his book “American Sniper.”  Specifically, the court reversed the 
unjust-enrichment judgment and vacated and remanded the defamation 
judgment for a new trial.  However, the most significant holding for North 
Dakota legal practitioners was that the Eighth Circuit vacated the district 
court’s defamation judgment and damages that were awarded in favor of 
Ventura, because the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying 
Kyle a new trial.  The court reasoned that both the closing remarks made by 
Ventura’s counsel and the improper cross-examination of witnesses from 
the publisher of Kyle’s book regarding insurance coverage prevented Kyle 
from receiving a fair trial.  One specific aspect of this holding involved the 
Eighth Circuit applying two standards to complement Rules 403 and 411 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and assessing the admissibility of insurance 
evidence to prove witness bias: the “economic ties” standard and the more 
popular “substantial connection analysis” common law standard that has 
been applied in a majority of jurisdictions.  Because Rules 403 and 411 of 
the North Dakota Rules of Evidence contain essentially the same language 
as their federal counterparts, Ventura and its application of standards for 
admitting insurance evidence to prove witness bias can be applied in future 
North Dakota cases involving similar evidentiary matters.  This application 
will provide North Dakota common law with a more unified and objective 
standard for determining the admissibility of insurance evidence. 
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I. FACTS 
Before his death, Chris Kyle,1 a former sniper for a United States Navy 
Sea, Air and Land (“SEAL”) team, authored the book “American Sniper: 
The Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper in U.S. Military History” 
 
1.  After Chris Kyle was killed in 2013, Taya Kyle, his wife and the executor of his estate, 
was substituted as the defendant in the case.  Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 878 n.1 (8th Cir. 
2016).  For simplicity, the defendant will be referred to as “Kyle.” 
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(“American Sniper”).2  “In this book, Kyle described punching a ‘celebrity’ 
referred to as ‘Scruff Face,’” later revealed to be political commentator, 
former Navy special forces member, and Minnesota Governor James Janos, 
more widely known as Jesse Ventura.3  The alleged altercation relating to 
this legal action took place at a California bar in October 2006, where Kyle 
and some friends were gathered after a funeral for a fellow Navy SEAL.4 
According to Kyle, Ventura made offensive remarks about both 
America and the Navy SEALs.5  After Kyle confirmed the fight with 
Ventura had occurred during both a radio interview and a television 
interview on Bill O’Reilly’s “‘The O’Reilly Factor,’” Kyle’s editor 
described the publicity from the radio interview as “‘priceless,’” while 
Kyle’s publicist “agreed the publicity response was ‘HOT, hot, hot!’”6  In 
2014, Kyle’s editor testified that 1.5 million copies of the “American 
Sniper” book had been sold.7 
After the radio and television interviews, “Ventura sued Kyle for 
defamation, misappropriation, and unjust enrichment on the grounds that 
Kyle fabricated the entire interaction with Ventura.”8  After the district 
court denied Kyle’s motion for summary judgment on Ventura’s claims of 
misappropriation and unjust enrichment, Kyle moved for summary 
judgment on all claims at the close of discovery.9  Kyle’s motion was again 
rejected.10 
Among witnesses’ testimonies for the defamation claim, two witnesses 
from the publisher of Kyle’s “American Sniper” book, HarperCollins, 
testified at trial.11  First, HarperCollins’s publicist, Sharyn Rosenblum, 
testified that the story regarding Ventura “was ‘a very insignificant part’” of 
the book and did not impact the success of the book.12  In fact, in regard to 
the general process of preparing the book for publication, Rosenblum 
testified that: 
[S]he did not know who “Scruff Face” was when she read the 
manuscript of the book, and did not ask.  She testified she did not 
 
2.  Id. at 878. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. at 878-79. 
5.  Id.  
6.  Id. at 879. 
7.  Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 879. 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. at 880. 
12.  Id. 
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see the “Scruff Face” subchapter as relevant to her publicity 
campaign for the book but she wanted to focus on “the themes of 
the war, military service, love of country, [and] the patriotism to 
serve one’s country.” She was “surprise[d]” when Ventura’s name 
came up in Kyle’s interview.13 
Similarly, Peter Hubbard, Kyle’s editor, testified that “the ‘Scruff Face’ 
story was not relevant to his decision to enter into a book contract with 
Kyle.”14  Plus, Hubbard also indicated that he never suggested 
incorporating the subchapter containing “the ‘Scruff Face’ story” into the 
book’s marketing campaign conducted by HarperCollins.15  Hubbard 
“characterized the ‘mention of Jesse Ventura’ as having a ‘negligible’ effect 
on the success of the book.”16 
When Ventura’s counsel tried to impeach Rosenblum and Hubbard by 
asking questions regarding both Kyle’s and HarperCollins’ insurance 
coverage to show that the book’s publisher “had ‘a direct financial interest 
in the outcome of th[e] litigation’ and the witnesses were biased in favor of 
Kyle,” Rosenblum denied knowledge of HarperCollins’ insurance policy17 
and Hubbard said that he did not know about any insurance provisions 
within the Kyle-HarperCollins contract.18 
However, during closing arguments, Ventura’s counsel stated that, 
“Sharyn Rosenblum testified that she did not know her company’s insurer 
is on the hook if you find that Jesse Ventura was defamed,” and despite both 
witnesses’ testimony, “[i]t’s hard to believe that they didn’t know about the 
insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s publishing contract.  Paragraph 
6.B.3. of Exhibit 82, Chris Kyle is an additional insured for defamation 
under the publisher’s insurance policy.”19 
After the district court denied both of Kyle’s motions for a mistrial, due 
to Ventura’s counsel’s questioning of the HarperCollins witnesses, and 
denied Kyle’s motion for a mistrial, “due to the insurance references once 
the jury was excused” during Ventura’s counsel’s closing argument, the 
jury reached an 8-2 verdict on the fifth day of deliberation.20  The jury 
 
13.  Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 880. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.  Ventura’s counsel specifically asked Rosenblum two questions: “‘[A]re you aware 
that the legal fees for the estate’s attorneys . . . are being paid by the insurance company for 
HarperCollins?’ and ‘Are you aware that HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in the 
outcome of this litigation because they are providing the insurance?’”  Id. 
18.  Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 at 880. 
19.  Id. at 880-81. 
20.  Id. 
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found in favor of Ventura regarding the defamation claim and awarded him 
$500,000 in damages.21  The jury made an advisory recommendation in 
Ventura’s favor regarding the unjust enrichment for approximately $1.35 
million in damages.22  However, the jury did find for Kyle regarding the 
misappropriation claim.23  Ultimately, the district court adopted the jury’s 
recommendations regarding both the unjust enrichment claim and its 
damages amount.24 
On appeal, Kyle argued the district court’s denial of his motion for a 
new trial “on the grounds that the jury’s ‘awards were tainted by the 
admission of prejudicial testimony and argument regarding [Kyle’s] 
insurance.’”25  Kyle also argued that the unjust enrichment judgment 
violated both Minnesota law and the First Amendment and that Ventura did 
not prove the amount that he was enriched.26 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
When determining the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove 
witness bias or prejudice, Rules 403 and 411 of both the Federal and North 
Dakota Rules of Evidence contain virtually identical language.27  However, 
while the Eighth Circuit adopted the majority substantial connection 
standard at the federal level, North Dakota strictly adheres to interpreting its 
evidentiary rules with no clear standard.28  This lack of uniformity within 
the Eighth Circuit common law may be due to the fact that no clear set of 
criteria exists for the substantial connection analysis. 
A. INTRODUCTION: GRANTING A NEW TRIAL 
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that upon a 
proper motion, a federal district court may grant a new trial on either all or 
only some of the issues,29 and to any party, in the following manners: 
 
21.  Id. at 881. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Id. at 878. 
24.  Ventura, 825 F.3d at 878. 
25.  Id. at 881. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 403, 411, with N.D. R. EVID. 403, 411. 
28.  See infra Part IV. 
29.  Courts must use discretion when determining whether one issue can be separately retried 
apart from the other issues in a respective case “without injustice.” 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 35 
(2016).  Furthermore, it is appropriate to limit a new trial to only certain issues “when it appears to 
the court that justice can be done by limiting the retrial to the area in which error occurred.”  Id.  
In addition, the propriety of granting a new trial on only certain issues “hinges on whether the 
issues to be retried are sufficiently distinct and separable from the others that the trial of those 
issues alone may be had without injustice.”  Id. 
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[A]fter a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has 
heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; or . . . 
after a nonjury trial, for any reason for which a rehearing has 
heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal court.30 
New trial motions must satisfy a “particularity requirement,” meaning 
that the motion must particularly state the grounds for the motion, otherwise 
the motion must generally be denied.31  Thus, if the assignment of error is a 
very general basis such as “‘the verdict is against the law’ or ‘against the 
evidence,’” a new trial ordinarily may not be granted.32  Essentially, then, 
an order for a new trial can only be granted on the specified ground(s) 
within the motion itself.33 
Furthermore, even though motions for a new trial are generally at the 
discretion of the district court, those types of motions are reviewed by a 
court of appeals for abuse of discretion.34  If a motion for a new trial is 
denied, reversing that denial “is proper if the district court made a legal 
error in applying the standard for a new trial or if the record contains no 
evidence in support of the verdict.”35  Regardless of whether a trial court 
grants or denies new trial motions, the rule stating that the review of either 
of those actions is only permissible in reviewing abuse of discretion where 
the motion is based on jury bias as well as misconduct of counsel or 
jurors.36 
Also, if a district court denies a new trial motion, an appellate court 
must affirm that decision “if a reasonable person could have reached a 
similar decision, given the evidence before him, not that a reasonable 
person would have reached that decision.”37  Likewise, a new trial will not 
be granted simply because the court would have reached a different 
conclusion than the jury reached.38  Rather, neither a reversal nor a new trial 
is required in the absence of “error affecting the substantial rights of the 
parties.”39 
 
30.  FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2016). 
31.  58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 345 (2016). 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34.  36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 636 (2016). 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 59 (2016); Hiser v. XTO Energy, Inc., 768 F.3d 773, 776 (8th 
Cir. 2014)). 
38.  58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 42 (2016). 
39.  Id. 
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Many aspects within the rationale of granting a new trial are predicated 
around the notion of fairness and justice.40  This includes claims of 
excessive damages, evidentiary matters,41 or other claims stating that the 
moving party did not receive a fair trial.42  In relevant part, new trial 
motions can also raise questions of law that arise out of “alleged substantial 
errors in the admission or rejection of evidence or in instructions to the 
jury.”43  In Ventura, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals cited language 
from its own common law precedent to establish that in order for Kyle to be 
granted a new trial on the defamation claim, the district court’s denial of 
granting a new trial must be “a ‘clear abuse of discretion.’”44 
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE UNDER FED. R. EVID. 411 
TO PROVE WITNESS BIAS OR PREJUDICE: THE SUBSTANTIAL 
CONNECTION MAJORITY STANDARD VERSUS MINORITY 
STANDARDS 
One of the oldest American legal doctrines still in use today is the 
“insurance exclusionary rule” and is currently codified within Rule 411 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.45  This rule basically states that “evidence 
that a party is or is not insured may not be admitted to prove that party’s 
negligence . . . it precludes any reference to the topic of ‘insurance’ that is 
intended solely to divulge the existence of a party’s insurance coverage.”46 
Similar to the rationale behind judicial discretion in granting a new 
trial, the rationale underlying the admissibility of insurance evidence 
involves notions of fairness and justice.  Specifically, unless a court 
approves of a legitimate and admissible purpose for insurance evidence 
under the confines of Rules 403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
evidence of liability insurance has generally been forbidden because it 
carries “a substantial risk of unfair prejudice, inviting the jury to find 
against a blameless defendant because the insurance company, not the 
defendant, will have to pay the judgment.”47  This rationale even applies in 
 
40.  Id. 
41.  Id. (Evidentiary matters include claims stating that the verdict was against the weight of 
the evidence). 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882 (citing Behlmann v. Century Sur. Co., 794 F.3d 960, 963 (8th 
Cir. 2015). 
45.  Alan Calnan, The Insurance Exclusionary Rule Revisited: Are Reports of Its Demise 
Exaggerated? 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1177, 1177 (1991). 
46.  Id. 
47.  2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON EVIDENCE § 9:22 (7th ed. 
2016). 
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cases dealing with the admissibility of evidence that a defendant did not 
have liability insurance because there is a “reverse risk” that a jury might 
base its decisions on sympathy for the defendant instead of the merits of the 
case.48 
Despite its expressed purpose of ensuring that jury verdicts are based 
on legitimate grounds rather than “the improper notion that a judgment 
adverse to the defendant will be passed along to a ‘deep pocket’ insurance 
company,” the insurance exclusionary rule has received much criticism, 
including the argument that today’s jurors “supposedly are not influenced 
by insurance references because they are already aware of the prevalence of 
insurance in such litigation and may actually presume its existence.”49  
Critics of the rule further argue that even if jurors are influenced by 
insurance references, “‘extensive and unnecessary arguments, reversals, and 
retrials stemming from elusive questions of prejudice and good faith’” 
make the insurance exclusionary rule too costly to implement.50  
Nevertheless, the insurance exclusionary rule still exists within Rule 411 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Although Rule 411 does not allow the introduction of evidence to show 
whether a person was insured against liability in order to prove if that 
person “acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully,” insurance evidence can 
be admitted to prove the bias or prejudice of a witness.51  However, Rule 
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to exclude relevant 
evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”52  In other words, as indicated by the 2011 
amendments to Rule 411, even if evidence is offered for a purpose not 
explicitly barred by Rule 411, its admissibility is still subject to the court’s 
discretion under Rule 403.53 
While the Eighth Circuit’s opinion is only broken down into one 
section regarding the defamation claim and another section committed to 
the unjust enrichment claim, the court’s analysis within the defamation 
 
48.  Id.; see also 23 WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5367 (1st ed. 
2016) (footnote omitted) (“And some courts have admitted evidence of insurance under the 
doctrine of ‘curative admissibility’ to impeach testimony by the defendant that insinuates that he 
is impecunious and will be harmed by a large judgment”). 
49.  Calnan, supra note 45, at 1177-79. 
50.  Id. at 1179. 
51.  FED. R. EVID. 411 (2016). 
52.  FED. R. EVID. 403 (2016). 
53.  FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment. 
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portion of the opinion contains several important subparts that collectively 
assessed whether the district court clearly abused its discretion by denying 
Kyle a new trial.  The first important subpart of this portion of the opinion 
analyzed the admissibility of the insurance testimony under Rule 411 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence that was given by the witnesses from 
HarperCollins.54  Specifically, the Eighth Circuit adopted the majority 
standard in this area of the law, the “‘substantial connection’ analysis” 
standard, which states: 
[I]n order to balance the probative value and potential 
prejudice . . . The substantial connection analysis looks to whether 
a witness has “a sufficient degree of connection with the liability 
insurance carrier to justify allowing proof of this relationship as a 
means of attacking the credibility of the witness.”55 
As early as 2001, the substantial connection standard was only adopted 
by “a handful of other jurisdictions,” even though commentators recognized 
that insurance evidence can potentially have a “distorting effect” during 
trial because juries are more likely to hold defendants liable and impose 
higher damages when those defendants are perceived to have a healthy 
source of assets.56  As late as 2003, only one jurisdiction adopted “a per se 
rule allowing the admission of commonality of insurance evidence.”57 
Currently, the substantial connection standard’s status as the majority 
standard closely aligns with the underlying rationale behind the 
admissibility of insurance evidence.  Specifically, the risk of unfair 
prejudice in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value is generally 
viewed as too high when either a defense witness’ affiliation with the 
defendant’s insurance company is “purely coincidental” or when both the 
defendant and his expert are merely policyholders in the same insurance 
company.58  In fact, it has even been encouraged to use other means besides 
introducing insurance evidence if those means can establish an equivalent 
bias.59  But despite its popularity, the substantial connection standard that 
was provided in Bonser v. Shainholtz is generally quite vague.60  However, 
 
54.  Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2016). 
55.  Id. (quoting Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. 2000). 
56.  J. Christopher Clark, South Carolina’s “Substantial Connection” Test for Introducing 
Evidence of Insurance to Prove Witness Bias, S. C. LAW. 15, 17 (2002). 
57.  Stacey D. Mullins, Evidence for Trial Lawyers, in ASSOC. TRIAL LAW. AM., ATLA 
WINTER 2003 CONVENTION REFERENCE MANUAL (2003). 
58.  FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 47, § 9:27. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Andrew M. LaFontaine, Rule 411: Excluding Evidence of Insurance Offered to Show 
Witness Bias, 38 COLO. LAW. 17, 17 (2009). 
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common law from multiple jurisdictions attempted to clear up that 
ambiguity.61 
After adopting the substantial connection standard in Yoho v. 
Thompson,62 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a substantial 
connection existed between the respondent’s expert witness and the 
petitioner’s underinsured motorist carrier that assumed the respondent’s 
defense.63  However, instead of establishing a generalizable standard, the 
Yoho court only determined a fact-specific standard applicable to that given 
case, holding that a substantial connection existed where, instead of merely 
being paid an expert’s fee in the case at hand, the expert witness: (1) 
“maintained an employment relationship” with both the insurance company 
in question and other insurance companies; (2) performed consultations in 
other cases for the insurance company in question; (3) gave lectures to the 
agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question; (4) reviewed 
records for the insurance company in question and other insurance 
companies so much that ten to twenty percent of his practice consisted of 
doing so; and (5) the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly based on his 
insurance consulting work.64 
Under Colorado law, courts must apply a two-pronged test to 
determine whether insurance evidence offered to show a witness’s bias is 
admissible: (1) determine if “a substantial connection exists between the 
witness and the insurance carrier” and (2) use the discretionary powers 
afforded to judges under Rule 403 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence to 
determine if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the insurance evidence.65  In Garcia v. Mekonnen,66 six 
years after the Bonser court articulated the substantial connection standard, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals sought to clarify the majority standard in 
two important ways.67 
First, after holding that an expert witness, who testified so many times 
on behalf of the plaintiff’s insurance carrier that nearly half of his income 
derived from such testimony, did not have a substantial connection with the 
respective insurer because no evidence showed that the expert witness’ 
 
61.  See generally ALASKA R. EVID. 403, 411; COLO. R. EVID. 403, 411; S.C. R. EVID. 403, 
411 (clarifying this jurisdictional comparison is useful because Rules 403 and 411 are similar to 
their counterparts in the Fed. R. Evid. and N. D. R. Evid.). 
62.  548 S.E.2d 584 (2001). 
63.  Id. at 586. 
64.  Id. 
65.  LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 17. 
66.  156 P.3d 1171 (Colo. App. 2007). 
67.  LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 17-18. 
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personal finances would be affected by an adverse judgment in the case, 
Mekonnen “established that the substantial connection test required 
something ‘beyond mere payment in exchange for testimony at trial.’”68  
Instead, the court illustrated that the substantial connection “had to rise to 
the level of ownership, agency, or employment to qualify.”69  In other 
words, the substantial connection must be “a relationship in which a witness 
has a ‘direct interest in the outcome of the litigation.’”70  In fact, as long as 
a witness does have a direct interest in the outcome of the respective 
litigation, courts have recognized a substantial connection even when an 
expert witness and a respective insurer do not have a formal employment 
relationship.71 
Second, Mekonnen crucially emphasized that even if a substantial 
connection is found, courts must still use their broad discretion under Rule 
403 of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, which is nearly identical to its 
North Dakota and federal counterparts, to determine insurance evidence’s 
admissibility.72  In other words, the substantial connection standard can 
greatly aid and supplement courts in determining the admissibility of 
insurance evidence, but the foundation of this type of judicial determination 
still rests in the rules of evidence.  In fact, the Mekonnen court emphasized 
that even if insurance evidence presents a substantial connection, judicial 
discretion under Rule 403 can set such a high burden of admissibility that 
the insurance evidence’s probative value can actually weaken if other types 
of evidence exist to show witness bias without mentioning insurance,73 
which would support the previously stated rationale that other means 
besides insurance evidence should be used if those means can establish an 
equivalent bias.74 
In addition to Mekonnen’s help clarifying the substantial connection 
analysis, Alaska’s jurisdiction provides two types of insight.  First, the 
Supreme Court of Alaska in Ray v. Draeger sheds light on the substantial 
 
68.  Id. at 18. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Ray v. Draeger, 353 P.3d 806, 812 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Mendoza v. Varon, 563 
S.W.2d 646, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978)). 
71.  Id. at 812-13 (citing Lombard v. Rohrbaugh, 551 S.E.2d 349, 355 (2001)).  The Draeger 
court elaborately agreed with this principle by further stating, “This is particularly true given the 
modern corporate structure where employment and consulting relationships are often created ad 
hoc or through an intermediary and do not conform to traditional direct employment 
relationships.”  Id. at 813. 
72.  LaFontaine, supra note 60, at 18. 
73.  Id. 
74.  FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 47, § 9:27. 
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connection standard in general.75  Second, Draeger helps illustrate a set of 
criteria that is associated with another closely related standard for assessing 
the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and 411 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in Ventura and any jurisdiction with similar 
language within its evidentiary rules.  This standard is known as the 
economic ties standard. 
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE UNDER FED. R. EVID. 411 
TO PROVE WITNESS BIAS OR PREJUDICE: THE ECONOMIC TIES 
STANDARD AS A SUPPLEMENT TO THE SUBSTANTIAL 
CONNECTION STANDARD 
In Ray v. Draeger, the Supreme Court of Alaska crucially rejected a 
minority common law approach to admitting evidence to show witness 
bias,76 which merely requires showing that a witness “was receiving money 
on behalf of the defense” and does not allow cross-examination to reveal 
the fact that the source of a witness’s payment(s) was a respective insurance 
company.77  The Draeger court stressed that jurors may not understand the 
vague reference of generally receiving money from the defense, plus the 
emphasis that “an expert witness with a substantial connection to insurance 
companies is working for the side with an interest in minimizing 
claims . . .” is best shown to the respective jury by describing the witness’ 
relationship with insurers in as clear terms as possible.78 
Not only does this minority approach contradict the majority approach 
under Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,79 the Alaska Rules of 
Evidence, and any jurisdiction with similar evidentiary rules for admitting 
insurance evidence, but limiting evidence to the vague proof of payment 
from the defense contradicts and devalues an evidentiary standard that is 
substantially related to the substantial connection majority standard: the 
economic ties standard. 
Under the economic ties standard, a party can ask a witness, who is 
testifying on behalf of the opposing insured party, about the following 
information in order to admit liability insurance evidence to prove that 
respective witness’s bias or prejudice: 
 
75.  Draeger, 353 P.3d at 815 (“[T]he weight of factors that the trial court must balance will 
generally be static because the potential for unfair prejudice will probably not vary and thus 
should tilt in favor of admission, absent unusual factual circumstances.”). 
76.  Id. at 813. 
77.  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 48 (footnote omitted). 
78.  Draeger, 353 P.3d at 814. 
79.  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 48; see also Draeger, 353 P.3d at 811 n.13. 
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[A]ny economic ties between the witness and the insurance 
company that might be expected to color his testimony. . . . any 
sort of economic tie that is likely to influence the witness to favor 
the insurance company in his testimony may be shown, such as 
ownership of stock in the company, or a promise of employment, 
or a promise to pay the witness directly for his testimony.80 
Furthermore, the opposing party can examine the witness regarding his 
prior employment with the respective insurance company, meaning that the 
economic tie(s) or relationship does not have to be one that is directly 
involved in the case at hand.81 
The economic ties standard’s similarities to the majority substantial 
connection standard was exemplified by the Draeger court, where the 
substantial connection emphasis was mainly based on an expert witness’ 
“significant ties to the insurance industry”82 or the “financial entanglements 
of [both the witness] and the consultancy through which he was hired,”83 all 
of which are primarily focused on financial relations or connections 
between an expert witness and the insurance industry.84  However, it is 
important to note that the economic ties standard is not identical to the 
substantial connection standard, because the former only focuses on 
financially related factors, whereas the latter is not confined to monetary 
factors.85 
 
80.  Id. (footnotes omitted) (“The justification for this inquiry is reflected in the ancient 
Slavic proverb: ‘Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.’”). 
81.  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
82.  Draeger, 353 P.3d at 813 (“[S]ignificant ties to the insurance industry as indicated by 
receiving a sizable portion of his or her income from insurance work, being hired by a firm that 
derives a large portion of its income from insurance companies, or facts that otherwise suggest an 
interest in the outcome of the litigation.”). 
83.  Id. at 815 (finding a substantial connection between an expert witness and the insurance 
industry where the “financial entanglements” of both the expert witness “and the consultancy 
through which he was hired” consisted of the expert witness being (a) highly compensated by the 
insurance industry to the point where his compensation for his insurance reviews represented a 
large percentage of his total yearly income; and (b) where the expert witness was hired for the 
Draeger case “by a company that does 98% of its work for insurance companies or defense 
attorneys.”). 
84.  E.g., Garcia v. McKonnen, 156 P.3d 1171, 1173 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). 
85.  Compare Wells v. Tucker, 997 So. 2d 908, 914-16 (Miss. 2008) (holding that no abuse 
of discretion occurred by the trial court in refusing to allow cross-examination of three defense 
experts to show possible bias as to the fact that all three experts’ medical malpractice insurance 
coverage was through the same insurance company as the defendant Tucker and that the experts in 
turn might incur a $136 penalty if the plaintiffs’ claim was successful, as the probative value of 
$136 “was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the 
admission of evidence concerning the existence of a liability insurance policy.”), with Yoho v. 
Thompson, 548 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 2001) (considering factors like maintaining an employment 
relationship with both the insurance company in question and other insurance companies, 
performing consultations for the insurance company in question in other cases, giving lectures to 
the agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question, reviewing records for the insurance 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In determining whether the district court clearly abused its discretion in 
denying Kyle a new trial on the defamation claim,86 the Eight Circuit 
provided very in-depth reasoning.  However, the appellate court’s holding 
was based primarily on two main areas of the law.  The legal area most 
relevant to North Dakota legal practitioners involved the analysis of Rules 
403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
A. THE COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC TIES STANDARD 
AND THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION STANDARD 
Overall, the Eighth Circuit remanded the defamation claim for a new 
trial because the district court clearly abused its discretion in denying Kyle 
a new trial.87  This was due, in part, to both Ventura’s counsel’s prejudicial 
questioning of the HarperCollins witnesses and their prejudicial closing 
argument statements referring to the HarperCollins witnesses’ knowledge 
of insurance coverage related to both Kyle and HarperCollins.88  However, 
the Eighth Circuit subtly combined the conceptual forces of the substantial 
connection analysis and the economic ties standard.89 
First, the Eighth Circuit quite simply applied the majority substantial 
connection analysis and determined that HarperCollins witnesses were not 
connected enough to the insurance carrier to allow Ventura’s counsel to 
cross examine the HarperCollins witnesses90 or make closing argument 
remarks91 to argue that under Rule 411, the HarperCollins witnesses “were 
biased in favor of Kyle because HarperCollins and Kyle were covered by 
the same insurance policy.”92  The court determined that a substantial 
connection showing bias or influence by an insurance policy was lacking 
because the HarperCollins witnesses were simply unaware of any such 
 
company in question and other insurance companies so much that ten to twenty percent of the 
expert witness’s practice consisted of doing so, and the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly 
based on his insurance consulting work). 
86.  Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882. 
87.  Id. at 888. 
88.  Id. at 885. 
89.  Id. at 883. 
90.  Id. at 882 (“At trial, Ventura’s counsel asked the witness Rosenblum, “whether she was 
aware Kyle’s attorneys were ‘being paid by the insurance company for HarperCollins’ and 
‘HarperCollins has a direct financial interest in the outcome of this litigation because they are 
providing the insurance.’”). 
91.  Specifically, Ventura’s counsel argued that “‘[i]t’s hard to believe that [Rosenblum and 
Hubbard] didn’t know about the insurance policy because it’s right in Kyle’s publishing 
contract.’”  Id. at 883. 
92.  Ventura, 825 F.3d at 882. 
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insurance policy here.93  However, behind this simple determination of a 
lack of substantial connection, contains a possibly significant expansion to 
the substantial connection analysis. 
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit’s substantial connection analysis could 
include the economic ties standard as well.  This possibility lies within one 
seemingly simple sentence within the court’s opinion: 
Even if [the HarperCollins witnesses] had been aware of a policy, 
any ‘connection’ they had to the insurance carrier was far too 
remote to create a risk of bias strong enough to outweigh the 
substantial prejudice of Ventura’s counsel’s pointed and repeated 
references to unproven insurance.94 
Two strong possibilities exist from this statement involving assessing 
the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and 411 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. 
First, the court, based on its substantial connection analysis background 
information,95 could have implicitly reaffirmed common law precedent 
stating that substantial connection analysis jurisdictions reject “a mere 
‘commonality of insurance’ approach, holding that the likelihood of bias is 
so attenuated that the risk of prejudice substantially outweighs the probative 
value.”96  However, this is unlikely because the court supplemented its 
substantial connection analysis with an analysis based on the economic ties 
standard.97  Specifically, the court concluded that no evidence showed that 
HarperCollins’ witnesses had any economic tie to HarperCollins’ insurance 
carrier because: “[t]hey were not currently or formerly employed by the 
insurance company, seeking employment with the insurance company, paid 
 
93.  Id. at 883.  For one, regarding Ventura’s counsel’s closing argument statement, the court 
noted that “[t]he one-line mention of insurance contained in the lengthy small-print contract 
merely acknowledges HarperCollins ‘may carry’ insurance. The publishing contract does not 
establish HarperCollins actually purchased insurance, much less that Rosenblum and Hubbard 
knew about it.”  Id. at 883-84.  Also, citing FED. R. EVID. 602, the court stressed that, “[a]s a 
matter of basic evidentiary foundation, Ventura never established by direct evidence or reasonable 
inference that Rosenblum and Hubbard even knew about any insurance coverage or possible 
insurance payment. Rosenblum and Hubbard had no personal knowledge on the topic and were 
not qualified to testify on the subject.”  Id. at 883. 
94.  Id. at 884 (footnote omitted) (citing FED. R. EVID. 403 (2016)). 
95.  See id. at 883 (citing common law precedent stating that substantial connection analysis 
jurisdictions reject “a mere ‘commonality of insurance’ approach”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 56-58 (stating that “a per se rule allowing the admission of commonality of 
insurance evidence” is the minority rule and that when either a defense witness’s affiliation with 
the defendant’s insurance company is “purely coincidental” or when both the defendant and his 
expert are both merely policyholders in the same insurance company, the risk of unfair prejudice 
in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value is generally viewed as too high). 
96.  Ventura, 825 F.3d at 883 (quoting Bonser v. Shainholtz, 3 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. 2000)). 
97.  Id. 
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for their testimony by the insurance company, or holders of stock in the 
insurance company.”98 
More importantly, the court stated that “[t]here was no risk Rosenblum 
and Hubbard might personally contribute to the payment of any judgment in 
favor of Ventura. Ventura even failed to show a judgment in his favor could 
adversely affect Rosenblum’s and Hubbard’s employment with 
HarperCollins.”99  While this analysis was included in the court’s 
application of the economic ties standard, its emphasis on Rosenblum and 
Hubbard being personally affected by the outcome of this case aligns very 
closely to the substantial connection analysis emphasized by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals in Garcia v. Mekonnen.  In Mekonnen, a substantial 
connection “had to rise to the level of ownership, agency, or employment to 
qualify.”100  The Ventura court’s analysis also closely resembled that of the 
Supreme Court of Alaska in Ray v. Draeger, where a substantial connection 
must be “a relationship in which a witness has a ‘direct interest in the 
outcome of the litigation,’” even if the expert witness and a respective 
insurer do not have a formal employment relationship.101  In other words, 
the Eighth Circuit in Ventura seemed to have recognized the economic ties 
standard’s similarities to the majority substantial connection standard102 to 
the point of using the former standard as a supplement to help establish 
strict criteria for determining whether a substantial connection was present.  
This opportunity for supplementation was provided to the court by the 
ambiguous nature that has plagued the substantial connection standard for 
years.103 
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS 
North Dakota has yet to join the majority of jurisdictions already 
applying the substantial connection analysis.  It is uncertain whether this 
reluctance is due to North Dakota’s contentment of its current status quo of 
assessing the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove witness bias, or if 
the reluctance is based on the lack of uniform criteria within the substantial 
connection jurisdictions.  Whatever the reason may be, only time will tell if 
 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Garcia, 156 P.3d at 1175; see supra text accompanying notes 68-69. 
101.  Draeger, 353 P.3d at 812; see supra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
102.  See supra text accompanying notes 76-84 (using Ray v. Draeger to exemplify the 
economic ties standard’s similarities to the majority substantial connection standard). 
103.  See supra text accompanying notes 60-85 (showing how common law from multiple 
jurisdictions have attempted to clear up the ambiguity found within the substantial connection 
standard, which includes a common law approach exemplifying the similarities between the 
economic ties standard and the majority substantial connection standard). 
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the recent high-profile case of Ventura in North Dakota’s own federal 
circuit will have any effect on North Dakota’s evidentiary common law 
moving forward. 
A. NORTH DAKOTA COMMON LAW: STANDARDS FOR GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE 
EVIDENCE 
Not only has common law firmly established the right for parties to test 
opposing witnesses for potential “bias or interest,” but modern codifications 
have almost universally included this right as well.104  Furthermore, the 
provision from Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence that allows for 
admitting liability insurance evidence to prove “bias or prejudice of a 
witness” is contained in virtually all state codifications, or is nonetheless 
implicitly permitted in the few states that do not specifically refer to that 
specific permissible use.105 
In fact, Rules 403 and 411 of North Dakota’s Rules of Evidence have 
virtually identical language to their federal counterparts,106 meaning that 
North Dakota appellate courts could apply the same substantial connection 
standard used in a majority of jurisdictions.107  However, despite those 
similarities, North Dakota common law appears not to be a part of the 
majority of jurisdictions applying the substantial connection standard when 
assessing the admissibility of liability insurance evidence. 
Under North Dakota common law, similar to federal law, the trial court 
has discretion in determining whether a new trial should be granted.108  If a 
“clear abuse of discretion” does not exist, a trial court’s decision will not be 
reversed on appeal.109  Furthermore, North Dakota requires a stronger 
showing of an abuse of discretion in granting a motion for a new trial than 
denying such a motion because while denying a motion for a new trial ends 
a case, granting such a motion merely continues the same case with a 
 
104.  David P. Leonard, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES 
OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY § 6.12.1 (2016). 
105.  Id. 
106.  See N.D. R. EVID. 403, 411 (2016). 
107.  For clarification see N.D. R. CIV. P. 59(b) (2016), which lists the grounds for a new 
trial; see also Smith v. Anderson, 451 N.W.2d 108, 112 (N.D. 1990) (finding that in North 
Dakota, an abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court acts “arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unreasonably.”). 
108.  Neibauer v. Well, 319 N.W.2d 143, 144-45 (N.D. 1982). 
109.  Id. 
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different jury.110  Thus, compared to an order denying a new trial, an order 
granting a new trial is subject to more limited appellate review.111 
However, unlike the majority of jurisdictions that employ the 
substantial connection standard, North Dakota solely relies on both 
exceptions under Rule 411 that allow for admitting insurance evidence, and 
the “balancing test”112 under Rule 403.113 
As early as 1959, North Dakota held that a new trial was required due 
to prejudicial error resulting from the disclosure of the fact that a defendant 
did or did not have liability insurance.114  In 1982, Neibauer v. Well, made 
an important distinction from prior North Dakota precedent by emphasizing 
that as long as a reference to insurance has the effect of informing the jury 
that the defendant has liability insurance, that statement can be prejudicial 
enough to warrant a new trial, even if that reference to insurance is 
“unexpected and inadvertent rather than solicited and deliberate.”115  
However, a minor, yet important, factor in Neibauer was that despite the 
North Dakota Supreme Court’s explanation of Rule 411, the plaintiff’s 
assertion that her reference to insurance was not prejudicial was not based 
on the admissibility exceptions under Rule 411.116 
This distinction was heavily emphasized in Filloon v. Stenseth, as the 
North Dakota Supreme Court noted that unlike the plaintiff in Neibauer, the 
appellants in Filloon specifically argued that the insurance evidence 
presented by them was for the admissible purpose of showing bias or 
prejudice under Rule 411.117  Furthermore, while the Court appropriately 
stressed that merely citing a Rule 411 exception does not automatically 
grant the admissibility of insurance evidence, the standard used for 
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence was the significantly 
discretionary “balancing test” under Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of 
Evidence.118  Overall, the closest North Dakota common law has driven 
itself away from strict adherence to Rules 403 and 411 is cumulatively 
 
110.  Ceartin v. Ochs, 516 N.W.2d 651, 652 (N.D. 1994). 
111.  Id. 
112.  Lacher v. Anderson, 526 N.W.2d 108, 109 (N.D. 1994). 
113.  N.D. R. EVID. 403 (2016) (explaining that this rule simply allows trial judges to 
determine if relevant evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice; confusing the issues; misleading the jury; undue delay; 
wasting time; or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). 
114.  Neibauer, 319 N.W.2d at 145. 
115.  Id. at 146. 
116.  Id. at 145. 
117.  Filloon v. Stenseth, 498 N.W.2d 353, 354-55 (N.D. 1993). 
118.  Id. at 355.  In other words, the Filloon court decided that instead of automatically 
excluding insurance evidence, trial courts must apply the Rule 403 balancing test to weigh the 
potential admissibility of insurance evidence offered under a Rule 411 exception.  Id. 
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weighing evidentiary errors to determine if defendants’ rights were 
deprived in such a prejudicial manner as to warrant the granting of a new 
trial.119 
B. ADOPTING THE COURT’S FEDERAL STANDARD OF DETERMINING 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF INSURANCE EVIDENCE FOR NORTH 
DAKOTA CASE LAW 
Being within the Eighth Circuit, North Dakota can offer its legal 
practitioners evidentiary legal insight regarding both state and federal 
evidentiary matters.  More importantly, however, Ventura indirectly poses 
an important challenge to North Dakota judges and justices.  Specifically, 
Ventura now forces North Dakota’s judicial officers to decide whether to 
continue on its current common law path in interpreting Rules 403 and 411 
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, or instead, to embrace the majority 
substantial connection standard that is applied in its own federal circuit.  
This decision, as one could easily predict, is logically simple, yet practically 
and subtly more challenging than anticipated. 
Arguably the most obvious reason for North Dakota courts to embrace 
the substantial connection standard is that the Eight Circuit already applies 
it when conducting an analysis under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 
411.  Because North Dakota’s evidentiary rules regarding the admissibility 
of insurance evidence to show a witness’ bias are virtually the same as its 
Eighth Circuit federal counterparts, the fact that Rules 403 and 411 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence contain virtually the same language as Rules 403 
and 411 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, would make logical sense 
for North Dakota courts to transition into the application of the majority 
substantial connection analysis.  Even if North Dakota practitioners were to 
argue that, as exemplified in Filloon v. Stenseth, maintaining North 
Dakota’s standard of adhering to the balancing test under Rule 403 for 
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence would provide North 
Dakota courts a great amount of discretion, this argument carries very little 
weight when considering that the substantial connection analysis also 
provides the majority of jurisdictions with a great amount of discretion as 
well.  The only difference here is that the substantial connection 
 
119.  Ceartin v. Ochs, 516 N.W.2d 651, 655-56 (N.D. 1994) (concluding that trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial where (1) parties’ attorneys allowed a report 
disclosing defendants’ liability insurance to reach jury; (2) counsel’s closing argument remarks 
referencing the existence of liability insurance; and (3) the jury’s award of future economic 
damages neither claimed nor supported by evidence; and also stating “[p]erhaps no single 
irregularity would have caused much concern. Cumulatively, however, they led the trial court to 
believe that the defendants may have been deprived of a fair trial.”). 
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jurisdictions share a uniform standard of assessing the admissibility of 
insurance evidence, while North Dakota seems to remain content on a more 
case-by-case approach that merely interprets Rules 403 and 411.  However, 
the uniformity enjoyed by substantial connection jurisdictions might be a 
deceptive mirage. 
As exemplified by cases like Yoho v. Thompson, Garcia v. Mekonnen, 
and Ray v. Draeger, the seemingly big happy family of jurisdictions that 
make the substantial connection analysis the majority standard still seems to 
lack a uniform set of criteria for establishing a substantial connection in 
each case between witnesses and respective insurance companies.  Thus, 
this lack of uniformity within the substantial connection jurisdictions help 
justify the reluctance that some North Dakota practitioners might have in 
abandoning the State’s current standard.  However, in tandem with its high-
profile status, the Eighth Circuit’s extension/supplementation to the 
substantial connection standard in Ventura might help persuade other 
substantial connection jurisdictions to follow in its footsteps and create a 
more uniform substantial connection analysis.  Specifically, Ventura might 
influence other substantial connection jurisdictions to also expand their 
criteria by supplementing the economic ties standard alongside the 
substantial connection analysis. 
While the substantial connection analysis is not confined to financially 
related factors, unlike the economic ties standard, having the latter’s strict 
set of criteria as a supplemental reference can promote greater uniformity 
among these jurisdictions, thus promoting a more uniform rule of law in 
general.  This was appropriately shown in the court’s opinion in Ventura.  
While the Eighth Circuit’s determination of a lack of a substantial 
connection was simply based on the witnesses’ lack of awareness of any 
relevant insurance policy, the Ventura court also likely adopted the 
economic ties standard as an alternative legal safety net that was used, in 
that case, to show a lack of substantial connection even if the witnesses 
were aware of an insurance policy. 
In sum, the law is not static.  Instead, the law is an evolutionary 
mechanism that changes with its surrounding environment.  On a national 
scale, the evolving manner in which jurisdictions have assessed the 
admissibility of insurance evidence to prove witness bias has been 
chronicled for over a decade now, as the substantial connection standard 
grew from a minority standard as early as 2001 to the majority standard 
today.  In fact, Ventura is proof that the substantial connection analysis is 
still changing and expanding.  The expansion and evolution of the 
substantial connection analysis might explain North Dakota’s reluctance to 
adopt that standard and abandon its current analytical approach.  Perhaps 
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Ventura will alleviate some of that reluctance now that North Dakota’s own 
federal circuit has expanded upon the majority substantial connection 
standard in such a high-profile case.  Only time will tell whether North 
Dakota becomes the next link in the majority standard’s chain. 
C. THE SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION STANDARD WILL PREVENT  NORTH 
DAKOTA FROM AIMLESSLY WANDERING ON A CASE- BY-CASE 
BASIS OF ANALYSIS 
Even if the substantial connection analysis jurisdictions do not enjoy an 
elegantly uniform set of criteria, it is important to remember this standard’s 
close alignment with the underlying rationale for the admissibility of 
insurance evidence.  In Vasquez v. Rocco, before adopting the substantial 
connection standard,120 the Connecticut Supreme Court stressed that even if 
a jurisdiction’s rules of evidence allow admission of insurance evidence to 
prove witness bias or prejudice, 
A concern remains, however, that jurors might be influenced by 
such evidence because they may believe that an insurance 
company is better able than the parties to bear any loss resulting 
from the defendant’s alleged negligence.  Although today’s jurors 
probably assume that all physicians carry malpractice insurance, 
“the introduction of evidence on the subject tends to emphasize 
something that is usually irrelevant and that may have an adverse 
effect on the quality of the jury’s deliberations and conclusions.”  
Nevertheless, the risk of undue prejudice to the defendant resulting 
from the introduction of such evidence must be weighed against 
the plaintiff’s right of cross-examination regarding motive, 
interest, bias or prejudice, a right that may not be unduly 
restricted.121 
In other words, the Vasquez court crucially emphasized the need to 
weigh virtually every trial participant’s interests when determining the 
admissibility of insurance evidence, including the defendants, the plaintiffs, 
and each jury member.  This emphasis on balancing multiple interests 
throughout the trial process is arguably the reason for why a majority of 
jurisdictions have adopted the substantial connection analysis, which 
 
120.  Vasquez v. Rocco, 836 A.2d 1158, 1165 (Conn. 2003). 
121.  Id. at 1163 (footnote and citations omitted); see also supra note 58 and accompanying 
text (emphasizing “the risk of unfair prejudice in relation to insurance evidence’s probative value 
is generally viewed as too high when either a defense witness’s affiliation with the defendant’s 
insurance company is ‘purely coincidental’ or when both the defendant and his expert are both 
merely policyholders in the same insurance company”). 
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provides an objectively beneficial supplement for jurisdictions’ evidentiary 
rules similar to Rules 403 and 411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
To put it frankly, the substantial connection analysis gives teeth to any 
judicial analysis regarding the admissibility of insurance evidence to prove 
witness bias.  At the same time, the substantial connection analysis still 
affords trial judges a great deal of discretionary power, only now they will 
have an analytical compass instead of wandering aimlessly on a case-by-
case basis.  While the Ventura court appropriately utilized this analytical 
compass, North Dakota continues to wander aimlessly with its mere 
reliance on the balancing test under Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of 
Evidence. 
With or without the supplemental assistance of the economic ties 
standard, the substantial connection analysis still places a burden on an 
offering party’s insurance evidence to pass a certain threshold to gain 
admissibility, otherwise other means besides insurance evidence should 
probably be used to establish bias.122  This threshold is clearly emphasized 
in Vasquez: 
Underlying this analysis is the premise that only some 
relationships between a defendant’s expert witness and the 
defendant’s insurance carrier give rise to an inference of bias that 
outweighs the countervailing risk that jurors might use the 
evidence for an improper purpose.  Thus, when a witness has a 
substantial connection to the defendant’s insurer, such as that of 
agency, employment or control, evidence of that relationship is 
considered sufficiently probative of bias that it is admissible 
despite the risk of prejudice to the defendant.  On the other hand, 
when the witness is merely a policyholder of the defendant’s 
insurer, the witness is unlikely to be influenced by that relationship 
and, consequently, the risk of prejudice to the defendant from the 
admission of such evidence is deemed to outweigh its probative 
value.  Thus, in the absence of any other connection between the 
witness and the defendant’s insurer, evidence that the witness and 
the defendant are insured by the same carrier is insufficient to 
justify the admission of that evidence under the “substantial 
connection” test.123 
 
122.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text (stressing “it has even been encouraged to 
use other means besides introducing insurance evidence if those means can establish an equivalent 
bias”). 
123.  Vasquez, 836 A.2d at 1164-65 (citations omitted). 
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Thus, within the term “substantial,” the substantial connection analysis 
can assess relevant insurance evidence’s connection to a witness in terms of 
its degree, quantity, or both, so long as that connection shows the insurer is 
likely influencing a respective witness to bias his testimony.  For example, 
in Yoho v. Thompson, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the 
substantial connection standard was met due to a quantitatively sufficient 
amount of cumulative evidence.124  Meanwhile, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals in Garcia v. Mekonnen took a different approach, focusing less on 
the amount of evidence, and instead focused more on the degree of 
influence that insurance evidence could have on a respective witness.125  
While each approach is subtly different, both can still be used to provide 
trial judges with a more reliable framework of determining the admissibility 
of insurance evidence to prove witness bias under the substantial 
connection analysis. 
North Dakota, on the other hand, has no such framework to assess how 
much influence an insurance carrier might have on a respective witness at 
trial.  Instead, the court in Filloon v. Stenseth merely ensured that insurance 
evidence cannot be automatically excluded at trial.126  This common law 
standard basically informs trials judges that the likelihood of a witness 
being influenced and biased from his connection with a respective insurance 
carrier completely depends on judicial discretion. 
In other words, North Dakota common law places offering parties at 
the mercy of a trial judge without the safety net of judicial restraints like the 
substantial connection analysis or even the economic ties standard.  This is 
not to say that North Dakota trial judges are untrustworthy or incompetent.  
Instead, the lack of any set standard also jeopardizes judicial decision 
making.  Without a standard like the substantial connection analysis, North 
 
124.  See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (exemplifying the satisfaction of the 
substantial connection standard through cumulative evidence where “[I]nstead of merely being 
paid an expert’s fee in the case at hand, the expert witness: a) ‘maintained an employment 
relationship’ with both the insurance company in question and other insurance companies; b) 
performed consultations in other cases for the insurance company in question; c) gave lectures to 
the agents and adjusters of the insurance company in question; d) reviewed records for the 
insurance company in question and other insurance companies so much that ten to twenty percent 
of his practice consisted of doing so; and e) the expert witness’s yearly salary was partly based on 
his insurance consulting work.”). 
125.  See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the substantial 
connection standard demanded more than mere payment in exchange for trial testimony, and 
instead required a connection between a witness and insurer “to rise to the level of ownership, 
agency, or employment to qualify”). 
126.  See supra note 118 and accompanying text (stressing that while merely citing a Rule 
411 exception does not automatically grant the admissibility of insurance evidence, the standard 
used for determining the admissibility of insurance evidence was merely the greatly discretionary 
“balancing test” under N.D. R. EVID. 403). 
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Dakota trial judges are forced to aimlessly rule on the admissibility of 
insurance evidence to prove bias, even if they are unfamiliar with this area 
of the law.  Without any guideposts to assist trial judges here, biased 
witnesses could be erroneously deemed unbiased and vice versa.  Until this 
judicial discretion is checked, North Dakota insurance evidentiary 
jurisprudence will likely remain in an uncertain case-by-case atmosphere. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, with regard to the defamation claim, the Eighth Circuit in 
Ventura v. Kyle vacated both the defamation judgment and damages award 
and remanded the defamation claim for a new trial.127  Within its holding to 
grant a new trial, the Eighth Circuit adopted a majority standard in the 
substantial connection analysis to bolster the codified method of 
determining the admissibility of insurance evidence under Rules 403 and 
411 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In essence, applying the substantial 
connection standard to the determination of insurance evidence’s 
admissibility still provides the trial court with a plethora of leeway and 
discretion when deciding cases, but the substantial connection standard 
helps to keep the trial court’s discretion in check on a more uniform basis. 
However, while the substantial connection standard is widely accepted, 
the way in which to determine whether a substantial connection exists 
between an expert witness and the insurance industry is not uniformly 
applied in each jurisdiction adopting that standard, leaving room for 
interpretation among each jurisdiction applying the substantial connection 
analysis.  Therefore, as a supplement to the substantial connection analysis, 
the Eighth Circuit applied the similar, yet different, economic ties standard 
to help determine that Kyle was entitled to a new trial based on the district 
court’s abuse of discretion for allowing Ventura’s counsel to ask overly 
prejudicial questions related to insurance to the two witnesses from the 
publisher of Kyle’s book, HarperCollins, as well as reference to Kyle’s 
insurance in their closing argument. 
Although North Dakota resides in the Eighth Circuit, its common law 
does not adopt the substantial connection analysis and merely interprets 
Rules 403 and 411 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, leaving arguably 
too much discretion in state trial courts’ hands. Since Rules 403 and 411 of 
North Dakota’s Rules of Evidence are virtually identical to their federal 
counterparts, North Dakota common law could easily adopt the majority 
 
127.  Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 888 (8th Cir. 2016).  In addition, the court reversed the 
unjust enrichment judgment and vacated the accompanying damages award as well.  Id. 
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substantial connection standard.  However, North Dakota common law may 
merely uphold the status quo due to the substantial connection standard’s 
lack of uniform criteria. 
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